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Neuropsychology at Work: Beyond "Human Error"

21 December 2025 by
Neuropsychology at Work: Beyond "Human Error"
Bree

In safety investigations, findings of “human error” remain all too common. This framing risks oversimplifying complex events and obscuring modifiable contributors to risk.

From a neuropsychological perspective, human error is rarely a cause. There is generally another why? and why is that? to be answered. Human error is more commonly an outcome emerging from the interaction between cognitive capacity, task demands, environmental conditions, and system design - not a root cause.

Why “Human Error” Is an Incomplete Explanation

Human cognition is full of possibility, but it is not limitless. Attention fluctuates. Memory is fallible. Actions can fail to adjust to changing conditions. Judgement can be shaped by stress, fatigue, time pressure, and competing demands.

When safety investigations resolve to the identification of a primarily individual contribution root cause, this inherently informs a failure of the safety system of controls and may overlook:

  • Excessive cognitive load
  • Work-related fatigue and sleep disruption
  • Poor information design or signal-to-noise imbalance
  • Environmental stressors that impair attention, adaptive behaviours and decision-making

Human error in safety incidents may be reframed as brain–environment mismatches, rather than individual failures.

Neuropsychology and the Roots of Error

You may be familiar with the term Human Factors. Neuropsychology can contribute to safety by examining the cognitive processes (with their bio-psycho-social underpinnings) involved in work performance, including:

  • Sustained and divided attention
  • Working memory and information integration
  • Executive functions such as inhibition, planning, and judgement

Lapses in these domains are not random. They are predictable under certain conditions, particularly when demands exceed cognitive capacity. Safety control systems should be designed to accommodate for these known limits of the human system.

A finding of human error prevents identification of modifiable contributors to an incident, or to risk. It is important to consider the individual factors in person-environment interactions to learn how we can improve the safety systems so the system doesn't fail in the face of normal human lapses. This enables proactive identification of risk factors before incidents occur. And the human and organizational performance principle is important: Blame fixes nothing.

Common cognitive risk contributors include:

  • High task-switching requirements
  • Dense or poorly prioritised information streams
  • Prolonged vigilance demands without recovery
  • Time pressure combined with ambiguity
  • Sensory overload or environmental distraction

These factors systematically increase the likelihood of attentional lapses and decision errors, regardless of experience or motivation.

Fatigue and Safety

Fatigue is one of the most significant yet underestimated safety risks. Fatigue impairs:

  • Attention and vigilance
  • Processing speed
  • Error detection
  • Emotional regulation and risk appraisal

Importantly, individuals are often poor judges of their own cognition (Van Patten et. al., 2025), and this extends to fatigued individuals being poor judges of their own level of impairment.

Situational Awareness and Signal Detection

Situational awareness is not simply a skill — it is a cognitive state shaped by workload, stress, fatigue, and environment.

Neuropsychological principles can enhance:

  • Signal detection (distinguishing critical cues from background noise)
  • Error recognition and recovery
  • Design of interfaces, notifications, and workflows that align with how attention actually works

Well-designed systems should not rely upon perfect human performance. As highlighted earlier, a finding of human error inherently indicates a control system that has failed as opportunity for continual improvement.

Safer Systems, Not Better Humans

From a neuropsychological standpoint, the goal of safety is not to eliminate human error, but to design systems that control for expected errors and otherwise empower optimal human performance.

When work environments support attention, memory, and decision-making under real-world conditions, safety improves — not because people change, but because systems do.

Neuro at Work series

This post forms part of a Neuro at Work series exploring how neuropsychological evidence informs safer, more effective organisational systems. Future posts will examine leadership, decision-making, and recovery at work.

 

References:

Dehais, F., Hodgetts, H. M., Causse, M., Behrend, J., Durantin, G., & Tremblay, S. (2019). Momentary lapse of control: A cognitive continuum approach to understanding and mitigating perseveration in human error. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews100, 252-262.

Van Patten, R. Mulhauser, K., Austin, T. A., Bellone, J. A., Cotton, E., Chan, L., Twamley, E. W., Sawyer, K., & LaFrance Jr., W. C. (2025). The association between subjective and objective cognitive functioning from a transdiagnostic perspective: An umbrella review. Clinical Psychology Review. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2025.102648

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